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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-2654 
_____________ 
 
FRANK KELLY; TODD R. RAY, as Trustees of the Plumbers and Pipefitters  
Local No. 520 Health and Welfare Fund; Plumbers and Pipefitters Local  
No. 520 Pension Fund; Plumbers and Pipefitters Local No. 520 Annuity Fund 
 
v. 
 
GAS FIELD SPECIALISTS, INC., 
                                               Appellant  
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (M.D. Pa. No. 1-14-cv-00004) 
District Judge:  Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 5, 2018 
 
Before:   AMBRO, JORDAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: June 19, 2018) 
 _______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Gas Field Specialists, Inc. (“GFS”) appeals from the District Court’s order 
granting summary judgment in favor of Frank Kelly and Todd C. Ray, as trustees (the 
                                                 
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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“Trustees”) of the Plumbers and Pipefitters Local No. 520 Health and Welfare Fund, 
Pension Fund, and Annuity Fund (the “Funds”), on their claim to recover delinquent 
contributions under §§ 502(a) and 515 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a), 1145.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND1 
 
At all times relevant to this appeal, GFS was an “employer” and the Plumbers and 
Pipefitters Local Union No. 520 (“Local 520”) was an “employee organization” as 
defined under ERISA.  29 U.S.C. § 1002(4)-(5).  The Funds are ERISA multiemployer 
employee benefit plans.  29 U.S.C. § 1002(3), (37).  Local 520 entered into a collective 
bargaining agreement with the Mechanical Contractors Association of Central 
Pennsylvania on behalf of its members (the “Agreement”), which governed, among other 
things, employee wages, hours, working conditions, and other benefits from 2012 to 
2015.  The Agreement set forth the trade and geographic scope of Local 520’s 
jurisdiction and required employers to contribute to the Funds for employees covered 
under the Agreement.  GFS joined the Agreement after its Vice President of Operations 
signed a Recognition Joinder on June 11, 2012, which provided that GFS “adopts and 
                                                 
1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  See infra 
note 3. 
We are addressing the scope of GFS’s contribution obligations solely as to 
employees covered under the 2012-2015 collective bargaining agreement between Local 
520 and GFS.  All references to GFS employees’ union membership pertain only to 
membership in Local 520. 
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agrees to be bound by the terms and conditions of the [Agreement.]”  (App. at 348.)  The 
Funds are third-party beneficiaries to the Agreement. 
In September 2013, the Funds undertook a compliance audit.  It revealed that, 
although GFS had employed both union and non-union employees, it had only made 
monthly contributions on behalf of union employees.  In January 2014, the Trustees filed 
suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, seeking a 
full audit of GFS’s employment and payroll records and demanding payment of any 
delinquent contributions that GFS owed to the Funds.   
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on liability.  Neither 
disputed the Agreement’s validity, and neither argued that its terms were ambiguous, but 
they vigorously disputed the scope of GFS’s contribution obligations under the 
Agreement.  The Trustees pointed to broad language in the Agreement covering “all 
employees of an Employer,” and argued that GFS had thus agreed to make contributions 
for all employees.  (App. at 343, App’x A.)  GFS countered that it was always the 
company’s understanding that any agreement with Local 520 extended only to union 
employees, and it argued that it had not made contributions for non-union employees 
under prior agreements for nearly a decade, without issue.   
The District Court granted the Trustees’ motion, and denied GFS’s motion.  It 
concluded that the plain language of the Agreement required GFS to contribute to the 
Funds on behalf of “all employees” falling within the Agreement’s trade and geographic 
scope, regardless of union or job status or particular project assignment.  (App. at 11.)  It 
also concluded that GFS had not shown that the Agreement was void ab initio due to 
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fraud in the execution and had not otherwise established a recognized defense to its 
contribution obligations.  Thus, the Court concluded that the Trustees were entitled to 
summary judgment on liability, but it deferred entering judgment pending the parties’ 
submissions on damages.   
Thereafter, auditors reviewed GFS’s employee roster and contribution records and 
calculated the delinquent contributions owed to the Funds.  The parties submitted those 
results to the Court, reporting GFS’s outstanding liabilities as follows:  
 Pension Fund:  $646,021.14 in contributions, $96,903.17 in liquidated 
damages, and $184,608.17 in interest; 
 
 Annuity Fund:  $248,055.66 in contributions, $37,208.35 in liquidated 
damages, and $70,993.25 in interest; and 
 
 Health and Welfare Fund:  $648,467.35 in contributions, $97,270.10 in 
liquidated damages, and $185,893.68 in interest. 
 
(App. at 19.)   
GFS did not dispute the auditors’ calculations.  Instead, it sought to excuse or 
reduce the amount it owed based on certain alternative benefits it had provided to 
employees for whom it did not make fund contributions.  Specifically, GFS said that it 
had provided alternative health insurance benefits at a cost of $146,166.23 and had made 
contributions to a 401(k) retirement plan in the amount of $25,566.31.  GFS asserted the 
alternative health insurance benefits as a total defense to an ERISA damages award for 
the Health and Welfare Fund.  It also argued that it was at least entitled to offset the total 
amount of alternative benefits from any damages awarded to the Health and Welfare 
Fund and the Annuity Fund, highlighting that the Funds otherwise stood to receive an 
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unjust windfall recovery of contributions on behalf of employees for whom they did not 
provide any benefits.   
The District Court rejected GFS’s damages arguments.  It reiterated its view that 
the company had failed to establish any of the recognized defenses to contribution.  The 
Court explained that GFS was not entitled to unilaterally excuse or reduce its contractual 
obligations to contribute to the Funds by providing alternative benefits, “[n]o matter how 
well-intended” its decision.  (App. at 24.)  Nor was the Court persuaded by GFS’s request 
for an “equitable exception” to prevent an unjust windfall to the Funds.  (App. at 23.)  It 
therefore entered summary judgment in favor of the Trustees and against GFS for the full 
amount of its delinquent contributions.2  This timely appeal followed.   
II. DISCUSSION3 
 
GFS raises the same arguments before us that it made to the District Court, and we 
too are unpersuaded.   
Section 515 of ERISA provides that all employers “obligated to make 
contributions to a multiemployer plan under the terms of the plan or under the terms of a 
collectively bargained agreement shall, to the extent not inconsistent with law, make such 
                                                 
2 The District Court also granted the Trustees’ motion for attorneys’ fees and 
costs, which GFS has not appealed.   
 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a grant of summary judgment is plenary.  
Deweese v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 590 F.3d 239, 244 n.8 (3d Cir. 2009).  
Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine disputes of material fact and if 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).  In reviewing a summary 
judgment ruling, we consider the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49. 
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contributions in accordance with the terms and conditions of such plan or such 
agreement.”  29 U.S.C. § 1145.  “Congress’s purpose in enacting section 515 was to 
allow multiemployer welfare funds to rely upon the terms of collective bargaining 
agreements and plans as written, thus ‘permit[ting] trustees of plans to recover delinquent 
contributions efficaciously[.]’”  Cent. Pa. Teamsters Pension Fund v. McCormick Dray 
Line, Inc., 85 F.3d 1098, 1103 (3d Cir. 1996) (first alteration in original) (citation 
omitted).  We apply the “basic principle of contract construction” that requires courts to 
“interpret and enforce unambiguous agreements according to their terms.”  Shaver v. 
Siemens Corp., 670 F.3d 462, 496 (3d Cir. 2012).  We have said that “[e]xtrinsic 
evidence … may not be used to create an ambiguity where none exists.”  Int’l Union, 
United Auto., Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers of Am., U.A.W. v. Skinner Engine 
Co., 188 F.3d 130, 145 (3d Cir. 1999). 
GFS appears to concede – as it must – that the Agreement, on its face, is not 
limited to union employees.  Rather, it provides that Local 520 is “the sole and exclusive 
bargaining representative for all employees in a unit consisting of journeymen, 
apprentices and other employees described in [the Agreement] in the employ of the 
Employer with respect to … all work described in Article II in this Agreement.”  (App. at 
325 ¶ 6(b) (emphasis added).)  Article II broadly defines the “trade or work jurisdiction” 
of the Agreement as “cover[ing] the rates of pay, rules and working conditions of all 
journeymen and apprentices engaged in” plumbing and pipefitting work as set forth in 
the Agreement, with geographical and trade jurisdiction further defined in Appendix A.  
(App. at 325 ¶ 7 (emphasis added).)  Appendix A then states, in similarly broad language, 
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that “[t]his Agreement shall apply to and cover all employees of an Employer employed 
to perform or performing plumbing, heating and piping work as listed hereinafter within 
the geographical jurisdiction allocated to the local union by the United Association[.]”  
(App. at 343 (emphasis added).) 
The Agreement’s employer contribution provisions also contain broad, unlimited 
references to “employee.”  The Health and Welfare Fund and Pension Fund provisions 
require contributions based on hours worked by “each apprentice and journeyman 
covered by this [A]greement,” and the Annuity Fund provision requires contributions for 
hours worked by “each employee.”  (App. at 336-37 ¶¶ 46, 47.)  The Agreement 
unambiguously covers “each employee,” regardless of union membership or project 
assignment.  Thus, the District Court correctly concluded that GFS’s suggested reading is 
betrayed by the plain language of the Agreement itself.   
We also agree that GFS failed to establish a viable defense.  We have recognized 
three defenses for employers against a fund’s claim to recover delinquent contributions, 
only one of which arguably applies here:  fraud in the execution.  See Agathos v. Starlite 
Motel, 977 F.2d 1500, 1505 (3d Cir. 1992) (listing defenses, including (1) that the fund 
contributions themselves are illegal, (2) that the agreement is void ab initio, due to fraud 
in the execution, and (3) that the employees have voted to decertify the union as their 
bargaining representative); accord McCormick, 85 F.3d at 1106; Connors v. Fawn Min. 
Corp., 30 F.3d 483, 490 (3d Cir. 1994).  We have described fraud in the execution as 
tantamount to “excusable ignorance of the contents of the writing signed,” Fawn Min. 
Corp., 30 F.3d at 491 (citation omitted), which GFS does not argue here.  Rather, GFS 
8 
 
relies on past practices and an unwritten understanding with Local 520 as modifying the 
unambiguous terms of a written collective bargaining agreement.  That is insufficient.  
See McCormick, 85 F.3d at 1103-04 (citing cases rejecting additional defenses such as 
fraud in the inducement or oral promises to disregard the text of an agreement).   
Finally, we reject GFS’s entreaty that we reduce its liability to prevent the Funds 
from receiving an unjust windfall recovery.  We have not previously endorsed a fourth 
“equitable” defense, and we decline to do so today.4  See McCormick, 85 F.3d at 1104-06 
(“If it means nothing else, section 515 means that, at least when the Trustees [of the fund] 
are not implicated in the alleged misconduct, their suit cannot be thwarted by defenses 
not apparent from the face of the [collective bargaining a]greement.” (first alteration in 
original and emphasis omitted) (quoting Bituminous Coal Operators Ass’n v. Connors, 
867 F.2d 625, 634 (D.C. Cir. 1989))). 
We adhere to a bright-line interpretation of § 515, which our case law has 
described “as severely limiting the defenses available to an employer who has signed an 
agreement which commits it to make contributions to a benefit fund.”  Fawn Min. Corp., 
                                                 
4 GFS has not argued that the Trustees acted in persistent dereliction of their 
fiduciary duty to pursue the Funds’ contractual right of contribution, as was the concern 
in Agathos v. Starlite Motel, 977 F.2d at 1507.  Indeed, the Trustees filed suit to recover 
any delinquent contributions within months of conducting an initial compliance audit.  
GFS’s reliance on the dissenting opinion in Central States, Southeast and Southwest 
Areas Pension Fund v. Gerber Truck Service, Inc., 870 F.2d 1148 (7th Cir. 1989) (en 
banc), is misplaced.  We have cited approvingly the majority opinion in Gerber Truck at 
least twice.  See Fawn Min. Corp., 30 F.3d at 491 (discussing Gerber Truck and 
distinguishing between valid defense of fraud in the execution and invalid defense of 
fraud in the inducement); see also McCormick, 85 F.3d at 1105-06 (discussing Gerber 
Truck, explaining that courts have construed § 515 as limiting defenses available to an 
employer sued by a welfare fund, and declining to recognize fourth defense of mutual 
mistake). 
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30 F.3d at 490; see also McCormick, 85 F.3d at 1105 (noting Congress’s concern that 
multiemployer plans – as third party beneficiaries – “must be able to rely on the plain 
language of collective bargaining agreements … in order to ensure that they have 
sufficient funds to pay out required benefits”).  The Funds are entitled to rely on the 
Agreement as written, and GFS is liable for its delinquent contributions under that 
Agreement. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For those reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment 
in favor of the Trustees and against GFS. 
